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Abstract 
This paper looks at media representations of the projected regeneration of Northern Ireland, 
paying particular attention to a recent promotional film made to elicit support for the 
redevelopment of a part of Belfast’s city centre. Commissioned by Castlebrooke Investments, 
‘Tribeca Belfast’ offers a future prospectus of the city that is as superficial as it is bland. It is, 
however, illustrative of two influential ideas and strategies that took flight at the end of the 
Cold War and the ‘triumph of capitalism’. One seeks peace through the application of 
neoliberal nostrums; the other combines brand theory with state-craft in pursuit of global 
competitiveness. Both propose models of citizenship that are politically benign, either 
preferring middle class solipsism or demanding brand loyalty. In Castlebrooke’s projection of 
a future Belfast, this translates into a city peopled by a mobile professional class, waited upon 
and entertained by servile locals. But such a sterile vision is inimical to building peace and 
political progress because it underestimates and downplays the significance of marginalised 
groups who through their activism and expressions of solidarity can lay better claim to the 






With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the erstwhile troubled province of 
Northern Ireland secured itself a reputation as an international ‘good news story’, achieving a 
political settlement after 30 years of bloody civil conflict. It seemed that the region could 
boast a blue-print for peace that could be exported to other similarly troubled and divided 
regions across the world. Its new political accord stood not only for peace between historic 
antagonists – Ulster unionists and Irish nationalists – it also held out the possibility of a 
‘peace dividend’ that would lift Northern Ireland out of the economic doldrums that had seen 
it rely on a large subvention from the British exchequer. Peace, it was assumed, would allow 
the redirection of money into public services and infrastructure that was once spent on 
security measures. Northern Ireland would enjoy the goodwill and largesse of wealthy 
patrons – the US in particular – and the region would at last be able to take its place as a 
proper constituent of the global economy, enjoying all the perceived economic spoils that this 
entailed.  
 
The optimism of that time has abated, dashed by the financial crash of 2008 and the 
subsequent deep cuts implemented by the United Kingdom (UK) government in London. 
Then, and perhaps not unrelated to the austerity imposed by Westminster, the Northern 
Ireland power-sharing executive collapsed in January 2017 amid allegations of financial 
malfeasance and political bad faith. On top of this the UK’s decision in 2016 to leave the 
European Union reopened the question of the border in Ireland. Yet Northern Ireland’s entry 
into global capitalism continues, and with it an acute sensitivity to the region’s global image 
and reputation, the good maintenance of which is seen as a prerequisite to attracting inward 
investment and tourists. Northern Ireland is, of course, not alone in its concern to present-
 3 
well on the global stage, but as the one-time poster-boy for peace and as a relatively 
peripheral region taking its place in the global free market, it offers an intriguing case study 
in the exercise of branding and media marketing of a region that bears a reputation for 
political dysfunction and violence.  
 
This paper looks at media representations of the projected regeneration of Northern Ireland, 
paying particular attention to a recent promotional film made to elicit support for the 
redevelopment of a part of Belfast’s city centre. Commissioned by Castlebrooke Investments, 
it offers a future prospectus of the city, and by extension the region, that is as superficial as it 
is bland, proposing a benign form of citizenship to the inhabitants of the city. Viewed within 
the context of previous on-screen representations of Belfast, the Castlebrooke film reveals 
something of how the contemporary city can be subject to a corporate imagination, distinct, 
that is, from the prevailing cultural tropes associated with the region. To understand this 
change the paper situates the Castlebooke film in relation to two harmonious and globally 
influential ideas and strategies that took flight at the end of the Cold War, and that have been 
at work in the local political economy. The first is what may be termed a liberal peace 
strategy that equated peace with the nostrums of neoliberalism, and banked on the growth of 
a self-interested middle class that would put its material comforts before political passions. 
The second strategy advanced the idea that to compete in the global free market, nations, 
regions and cities needed to behave like commercial brands, and organise and market 
themselves accordingly. Like the liberal peace approach, it is predicated upon a model of 
citizenship that forgoes political conviction and instead submits to, or works in accord with 
purely commercial imperatives. In Castlebrooke’s projection of a future Belfast, this 
translates into a city inhabited by a mobile professional class, waited upon and entertained by 
subservient locals. While Castlebrooke’s promise of a commercially vibrant, cosmopolitan 
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Belfast at peace with itself is beguiling, this paper suggests that it is nonetheless a fantasy in 
denial of the sectarian realities; persistent, deepening poverty; and social exclusion and 
discrimination in the region. Furthermore, and crucially, it is a politically sterile vision that 
underestimates and downplays the significance of the very marginalised social groups whose 
activism has been integral to building peace and who continue to improve the quality of that 
peace by fighting poverty and social inequalities. This paper concludes by suggesting that 
such committed activism and expressions of solidarity lay better claim to being the 
‘international heart’ and ‘Belfast soul’ evoked in Castlebrooke’s promotional film. 
 
The liberal peace strategy 
 
At the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the apparent 
triumph of capitalism, the way was clear for Western-led liberal peace strategies to be applied 
in a number of war-torn contexts. Key to these strategies was global convergence towards 
market liberalisation. (Pugh 2005). As Jan Selby argues, liberal orthodoxy takes for granted a 
broad equation of economic liberalisation, globalisation and peace. Accordingly, what 
became known as neoliberalism was viewed as having the power to transform violent 
conflicts, redirecting societal forces away from war and towards commerce and peace (2011: 
16). The spirit of the global free market, its advocates believed, corresponded with places 
distinguished by their openness and good relations. This, then, would best be advanced 
through processes of regional integration and globalisation, softening national borders to 
facilitate flows of capital, goods and people (Selby 2011: 17). The anticipated return on this 
new economic mobility was an attendant decline in the old state-centric national allegiances, 
and in their place the growth of self-confident diasporas and pluralistic identities (Selby 
2011: 18). Crucially, this liberal cosmopolitanism and its associated free trade were the 
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purported harbingers of economic regeneration, functioning as the proverbial rising-tide that 
lifts all boats, thus growing the middle class and alleviating the sort of poverty that liberal 
orthodoxy assumes is the seed bed of conflict. As Selby explains:  
The middle class, so the argument goes, prioritise material prosperity and opportunity 
over war: they are an essentially peace-oriented class. The poor, by contrast, lack 
these opportunities, and are thus much more likely to be attracted by the lure of self-
affirmation through violence (Selby 2011: 19). 
For liberal peace strategists, this model of economic and social regeneration, designed to 
grow and embolden a middle class, naturally proposes a privileged place for business, both 
domestic and foreign in post-conflict regeneration. The business class would husband the 
peace, delivering prosperity and strengthening the hand of those constituencies opposed to a 
return to war (Selby 2011: 19). 
 
Along these lines, Guy Ben-Porat (2006) has argued that Northern Ireland’s business 
community played a key role in persuading politicians to compromise in the interests of 
peace. Incentivised by the economic opportunities presented by the European Union and 
globalisation, Ben-Porat credits the local business class with benign intervention in the 
evolving peace process and engagement in politics more directly. Nevertheless, he argues, 
business interests were careful to circumnavigate the potential controversies of party politics, 
taking care to advance its peace agenda through civic channels and by speaking in a strictly 
‘professional’ capacity. Therefore, when the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 
Northern Ireland endorsed the Good Friday Agreement, it did so in terms that anticipated 
economic benefits once peace had been secured. Political accord would enable commerce and 
industry to flourish, the CBI said, and as a corollary a post-conflict economic boost would 
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surely deliver jobs and support public services, improving schools, healthcare and the 
environment (Ben-Porat, 2006: 247).  
 
In orthodox understanding, this was the much vaunted peace dividend. It never materialised; 
or at least not in the fulsome, evenly distributed manner dreamed of by the CBI. On the 
contrary, as Colin Knox has argued in respect of the region’s most socially and economically 
disadvantaged wards, the performance gap across a range of key quality of life indicators – 
education, ‘worklessness’, mental health, life expectancy and crime – is in fact widening, due 
in significant measure to the ‘deficit reduction’-led squeeze (aka austerity) on public 
spending as well as, since 2008, the deflationary effects of the global economic crisis (2016: 
501). According to a recent Joseph Rowntree Report, 370,000 people in Northern Ireland live 
in poverty, 110,000 of whom are children, 220,000 working-age adults and 40,000 pensioners 
(2018: 2). While these levels compare favorably with England and Wales, Northern Ireland 
has greater rates of worklessness, lower employment and lower wages than elsewhere in the 
UK. Counter to the fantasy preferred by the business leaders, Colin Coulter notes:  
The record of the Northern Irish economy over the course of the peace process has 
been poor in terms not only of the volume of new jobs created but their quality as 
well. Relatively few of the positions that have been created over the last two decades 
have been in high wage, high value added occupational sectors (2019: 126) 
On top of this, Coulter highlights the devasting consequences of the UK Government’s 2012 
Welfare Reform Act on a region that is already at an economic disadvantage, and he remarks: 
‘What is striking about the poverty that exists in Northern Ireland is not merely its scale but 
also its inability to make any real impression on mainstream political debate’ (2019: 136). 
The persistence of poverty in Northern Ireland, deepening during the era of austerity, and its 
apparent inability to occupy any significant time and space in public debate, is important to 
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reflect upon given liberal peace strategists’ avowed commitment to the global free-market 
and growing the middle class as valorous agents of economic and social transformation. 
 
Branding Peace and ‘living the brand’ 
 
Hand in glove with liberal peace strategies, Northern Ireland’s integration into the global free 
market has been accompanied by efforts to brand it as a region that is ‘open for business’. In 
an attempt both to erase the stain of conflict, as well as the view that the region labours under 
a regime of economic dependency akin to a ‘workhouse economy’ – a description applied to 
Northern Ireland during the ‘troubles’, which referred to how most people appeared either 
involved in the administration of benefits or policing one another (Rowthorn 1987: 117). On 
the basis of opportunities thus created by an entrepreneurial genie released from the peace 
process bottle, the ‘new’ Northern Ireland strives to present a very different face on the 
global stage. In key respects a reputation for peace after war becomes part of the Northern 
Ireland brand, but it is more that. The region is now subject to what Daniel Jewesbury and 
Robert Porter call a ‘moralising politics of social and economic development’.  
By this we mean that there is a strong connection between the twin narratives of 
political progress and social-economic development in contemporary Belfast; that 
post-Agreement Belfast has, to a significant degree, become a story in which the twin 
moral goods of political progress and privatised, neo-liberal economic development 
are folded into one another (2010: 36) 
 
The idea of branding cities, regions and nations emerged as a commercial practice closely 
linked to globalization narratives at the end of the Cold War (Curry Jansen 2008: 121). At 
core it treated places like companies or products, striving to develop for a location a 
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competitive brand identity in a crowded global market place. However, exponents of the idea 
emphasize that this is no exercise in mere packaging; it is nothing less than the convergence 
of brand theory with state-craft. Simon Anholt accordingly argues that it ‘is the glue that 
binds together a range of different tools for national promotion and reputation management’, 
but it is about more than competitive advantage and commercial imperatives: ‘properly 
understood it is primarily about people, purpose and reputation, and only secondarily about 
money’ (2007: 18). Similarly, for van Ham, branding ‘is not only about “selling” products, 
services and ideas, it is not only about gaining market share and attention, it is also about 
managing identity, loyalty and image’ (225). He argues that politicians who successfully 
manage their region’s brand equity achieve two things: one, they speak to external clients, 
and therefore attract talent and inward investment; and secondly, internally, they make their 
citizens ‘feel better and more confident about themselves by giving them a sense of 
belonging and a clear self-concept’ (2002: 253). Branding is then both an economic and 
political project. 
 
The depth of branding’s potential penetration into public life is made clear by Anholt’s belief 
that it is ‘inherently democratic’, since it directs political energy towards persuasion rather 
than coercion, propaganda and lies (2007: 40).  In a serendipitous collision with liberal peace 
initiatives, it guides regions and nations towards peaceful co-existence, since 
Branding is an acknowledgment that territorial actors need to implement competitive 
global policies and strategies designed to achieve prosperity and influence. Since 
commerce has become the only legitimate area of competition, location branding, PR 
and marketing become contemporary equivalents of military doctrine. […] Brand 
states still ‘make war’ (and are themselves ‘made’— i.e., shaped and constructed by 
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‘war’), but here in a non-violent contest for market-share and visibility (van Ham 
2002: 265). 
Perhaps what branding the nation strives for among its citizens is perfectly encapsulated in 
Anholt’s term, ‘benign nationalism’, which he refers to as ‘the first and most important 
component’ of any national competitive identity strategy – ‘the stakeholders in the 
corporation “live the brand”’ (2007: 16).  
 
The idealism of Anholt’s belief in an enlightened business elite’s capacity to override historic 
conditions of political and cultural conflict and economic marginality through the magic of 
marketing is striking. Applied to Northern Ireland, for example, the notion of an 
unproblematically ‘benign nationalism’ as a transformational force is a farcical nonstarter. 
However, in more general terms, the nation-as-brand, with its benign national identity, is a 
shift from traditional academic discourse of nation and belonging. The nation as ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1981) has historically been the work of its ‘scribbling class’ broadly 
conceived – politicians, pundits, preachers, poets, publicists and scholars (Curry Jansen 2008: 
124). Nations have their languages, flags and anthems, myths of origin and the symbols that 
accompany them, and often such symbols are put to work by Northern Ireland’s political 
antagonists, mobilizing the familiar tropes of nation in the existential dispute over ownership 
and hegemony, in the past and, most sharply, in the future. And yet, as Sue Curry Jansen 
points out, in the contemporary world of mass media and digital communications, the old 
scribbling class is joined by those skilled in marketing, public relations and media 
production. In the business-speak of their dubious discourse, these are the architects of the 
branded nation. For Curry Jansen – drawing upon the work of Anne Cronin (2008) – they are 
engaged in a project that transforms civic space into a commercial and ‘calculative space’: 
that is, space ‘constituted by marketing data and decision making rather than conceived in 
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terms of social relations or governance’ (2008:  122). Curry Jansen’s conclusions are bleaker 
about the mechanisms of capitalism than the optimistic prognosis of Anholt and van Ham. 
She argues that nation branding is an engine of market fundamentalism and profoundly anti-
democratic. It is, she says, a: 
monologic, hierarchical, reductive form of communication that is intended to 
privilege one message, require all voices of authority to speak in unison, and 
marginalize and silence dissenting voices. The message itself is, by design, hyper-
visible, but the decision making involved in arriving at it and the multiple agendas 




The Propaganda of Peace 
 
Sue Curry Jansen’s critique centred on the experience of Estonia as it emerged out of Soviet 
vassalage in the early 1990s, facing at that moment the economic and political challenges of 
globalization in the neoliberal age. McLaughlin and Baker had similar concerns about 
Northern Ireland, emerging as it was from decades of conflict, with its own political and 
economic challenges. In The Propaganda of Peace they argued that just as citizens 
sometimes need to be persuaded of the efficacy and righteousness of war, so in Northern 
Ireland they needed to be persuaded that peace was possible and that erstwhile enemies could 
become partners in government. They argued that while institutions of the state played a key 
role in the propaganda of peace, they acted  
in concert with other hegemonic social forces, such as local businesses and political 
elites, trade unions, the voluntary and community sector, academia and the media. 
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Persuading for peace is no less propaganda because of its association with civil 
society and its apparently benign intentions, for it displays a coherent set of ideas and 
values that seek to mobilise people to act and behave in the interests of power. (2010: 
11) 
 
There were two main strands to the propaganda of peace. The first sought to act as a 
‘persuader’ for peace and reconciliation. The second, implicit in official ‘peace dividend’ 
narratives, strove to prepare Northern Ireland for entry into the global free-market and ready 
its people for the anticipated adjustments to their lives and behaviour that the forces of 
neoliberal political economy and globalization would demand – or, as Anholt puts it, 
instruction in how to ‘live the brand’. This second strand was manifest in a tranche of film 
and television dramas made during the period of the peace process, the overwhelming 
majority of which depicted central characters who eschewed political expression and activism 
in favour of a blissfully banal domesticity, romantic communion and family life. In fact, 
forays into the world of politics were routinely represented as abhorrent or endangering the 
family life of characters. In this way on-screen drama tended to operate a strict demarcation 
of the public and private, featuring a preferred category of valorous ‘ordinary people’; ‘an 
entirely constructed category; rarely permitted serious political convictions and motivations, 
and distinguished by their passive, domesticated citizenship’ (McLaughlin and Baker 2010: 
71).  
 
Just as post-troubles Northern Ireland was being presented with this version of brave 
domesticity, the physical environment and familiar iconography of the place was subject to a 
make-over. The business optimism of Waterfront developments, cultural and business 
quarters, grand conference and concert halls, large retail arcades, boutique residence, all 
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found their correspondence in film and television drama. Here, for example, as Martin 
McLoone illustrated, romantic comedies now played out against the backdrop of urban 
renewal, Belfast’s brightly lit historic buildings and the glossy imagery of ‘an affluent middle 
class with its culture of high-spend consumerism and metropolitan aspirations’ (McLoone 
2008: 59). Crucially, the British government through the Northern Ireland Office played its 
part in transforming Northern Ireland’s global image and reputation, promoting the region as 
commodity real estate and site of conspicuous consumption. In 1995, the NIO commissioned 
a series of promotional public information films – advancing an anti-sectarian theme of peace 
and reconciliation. Two of these short films represented Northern Ireland in a commercially 
affirmative light. Northern Irish Quality celebrated the region’s sporting and cultural 
achievements with a montage that included celebrated icons such as footballer George Best, 
athlete Mary Peters and film star Liam Neeson. Another, Northern Irish Spirit, had the look 
of a tourist travelogue, with images of the region’s stunning coastal and rural scenery, 
accompanied by the strains of Belfast-born Van Morrison’s song, ‘Have I Told You Lately.’ 
This was quite a turnaround in Belfast and Northern Ireland’s troubles-era image, better 
known for its images of a dark, ‘strife-torn maelstrom’ and fated violence (Hill 1987). 
Against such dominant depictions, the clear point of the NIO films was to encourage local 
viewers, in the context of a ‘new dispensation’, to see and think about the region as a 
potentially lucrative commodity in the global market place, attractive to foreign investors and 
tourists alike, but only, of course, if their ‘good’ political behaviour could be assured. 
Northern Ireland was still able to produce psychopathic killers for the screen, but now they 
committed their crimes in more stylish surroundings and gentrified environments, and for 
non-troubles related motives. The BBC drama, The Fall, about a Belfast serial killer, that ran 
for three series, is a case in point. Its dark subject matter was no deterrent to tourist agencies 
that linked to the series’ BBC website, which also included an interactive map of the shooting 
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locations – including the Waterfront Hall, Bert’s Jazz Bar, Botanic Gardens, the Hilton and 
Merchant hotels – all key tourist destinations.1  
 
This is not to say that films dealing with Northern Ireland’s violent past have disappeared 
from screens entirely. Indeed, a residual commitment to public service broadcasting in the 
UK and a tradition of social realism has played a role in producing a series of films dealing 
with historical events. Paul Greengrass’s Bloody Sunday (2002) and Jim McGovern’s Sunday 
(Charles McDougall, 2002) re-enacted the murder of civil rights demonstrators by British 
Paratroopers in Derry, 1972. Greengrass and Guy Hibbert’s drama documentary Omagh (Pete 
Travis, 2004), brought to the screen the campaign for truth and justice in the wake of the Real 
IRA’s bombing of the market town on 15th August 1998, which killed 31 people. There have 
been a number of feature documentaries that investigate allegations of state collusion – No 
Stone Unturned (Alex Gibney, 2017) and Unquiet Graves (Sean Murray, 2018). The 
‘troubles’ can also still provide the backdrop to generic thrillers such as ’71 (Yann Demange, 
2014), about a British soldier, injured in a Belfast riot and left by his unit behind enemy lines. 
But the ‘official’ strategy is to project NI as an ‘area of outstanding natural beauty’, bucolic 
scenery and clean modern cityscapes in order to attract inward investment and tourist dollars. 
As Arlene Foster put it when she was Northern Ireland’s Enterprise Minister: ‘Capturing the 
attention of prospective holidaymakers is essential to ensure Northern Ireland stands out from 
other destinations. In order to attract new and repeat visitors, Tourism Ireland will be seeking 
opportunities to capitalise on the huge worldwide popularity of HBO's Game of Thrones 
[…]’2  
                                               
1 The BBC’s web pages dedicated to The Fall include a link to Discover Northern Ireland’s website, as well as 
an interactive map of the series locations. (accessed on 4 May 2019 here: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p0295tcf) 




The filming of HBOs Game of Thrones on location in Northern Ireland is without question 
the region’s finest marketing achievement. The series often highlights the sort of attractive 
rural and shoreline scenery previously promoted in the NIO’s Northern Irish Spirit. It also 
films on the site that was home to Belfast’s once thriving shipbuilding industry, now known 
as the Titanic Quarter, a multipurpose waterfront development named after the most famous 
ship built in the Belfast yards. Northern Ireland Screen, the region’s publicly funded film and 
television development agency, has given £14.85 million to HBO as an incentive to use local 
locations. Official claims made for the return on this investment, in terms of revenue 
generated in goods and services and spending in the regional economy, are estimated at £166 
million. However, as Ramsey, Baker and Porter argue, there has been a lack of proper critical 
scrutiny of the economic claims made regarding Game of Thrones and the screen industries 
generally in Northern Ireland (2019). Other media events located in region include the 2011 
MTV European Music Awards, the G8 summit in 2013 and the Giro d’Italia in 2014, each 
highly prized for the international exposure they give, and all of them at considerable public 
expense. The cost of hosting the G8 alone was estimated at £92m.3 The then UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron, pre-empted critics of such public expense by stating that you 
‘couldn't put a value’ on the free advertising Northern Ireland acquired as a result of the 
summit of world leaders.4  
 
If the economic gains of such global exposure are unsubstantiated, the cultural and political 
consequences of a screen culture committed largely to commercial imperatives has barely 
been considered. There is a danger that a ‘post-conflict society anticipates a post-political 
                                               
3 ‘G8: New report says final cost for Fermanagh summit was £92m’, BBC News online, 23 January 2015 
(accessed on 2 May 2019 here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-30942938) 
4 ‘Summit location “a fantastic venue”’, Belfast Telegraph, 18 June 2013 (accessed 2 May 2019 here: 
 https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/summit-location-a-fantastic-venue-29354879.html) 
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cinema; that the achievement of constitutional accord and the aspiration to full membership 
of the global free market render a politically engaged cinema both apparently irrelevant and 
undesirable’ (Baker 2016: 184).  
What need has Northern Ireland of a political cinema when it has achieved a 
constitutional accord and when film presents a delightful opportunity to market the 
region on the world stage? Here the confluence of political self-congratulations with 
economic imperatives and ambitions combine to offer a seemingly cast-iron case for a 
depoliticised film culture (Baker 2016: 184). 
Except Northern Ireland has nothing to be politically complacent about. At the time of 
writing it has no functioning Assembly, its social divisions and inequalities are stark, and 
there has been a failure to deal with ‘legacy’ issues arising from its violent past. Indeed, the 
depth of Northern Ireland’s malaise is seen in its failure to achieve any sense of political and 
cultural integrity despite the Good Friday Agreement. As David Butler argued in 1995 – and 
it still holds true today – Northern Ireland has ‘no neutral language, verbal or visual, no 
uncontested images, and certainly no unifying imagery. Every signifier appears to be spoken 
for’ (1995: 105). Twenty-one years after the signing and public ratification of political 
accord, Northern Ireland does not really exist, not in any deep, emotional, imaginative sense: 
certainly not for Irish nationalists who have no long-term vested interest in the place and 
whose cultural imaginations and allegiances exceed the six counties. But it does not even 
really exist for those unionists for whom ‘Ulster’ is a surrogate for Northern Ireland; a 
province of their exclusivist cultural imaginations that bears no proper relation to the territory 
upon which they walk or the constitution they claim to defend.  
 
This is not to suggest that politics in Northern Ireland are strictly binary. A growing number 
of people identify as neither unionist or nationalist – 50% of respondents to a recent Northern 
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Ireland Life and Times Survey.5  However this is not reflected at the polls, when votes for 
unionist and nationalist parties continue to far outweigh those of Others, although political 
parties of the centre and left have made modest gains in recent elections. Even the small 
portion of the population that identify as Northern Irish, rather than British or Irish, have 
according to Tonge and Gomez, ‘failed to flourish on a cross-community basis’ (2015: 294), 
while McNicholl has found that ‘Northern Irishness is simply not a constituency that 
demands substantial recognition from the elected representatives in the Northern Ireland 
Assembly’ (2018: 511). Nevertheless, while relatively small in number, that constituency of 
Others might have a key role to play in Northern Ireland’s future. What that group decides to 
do in the face of Brexit and the associated rise of English nationalism might determine 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional future. Nevertheless, it remains the case that simply put, not 
enough people care sufficiently about Northern Ireland to build a consensus around how to 
live, love, work and think there. In effect, it lacks any sense of what Benedict Anderson once 
referred to as the ‘profound emotional legitimacy’ one associates with the imagined 
community of the contemporary nation. Little wonder then that in this post-conflict period it 
is potentially easy prey to developers and marketing moguls who view it, in the words of 
Harcourt Developments, as ‘a pleasingly blank canvas’ (Quoted in Ramsey 2013: 176) ripe 
for regeneration and capital accumulation.  Or as Northern Ireland Screen put it: ‘the most 
compact 5196 square miles of back-lot in the world’.6 ‘In effect Northern Ireland is rendered 
a tabula rasa – a mere location for economic activity far removed for the cultural lives and 
experiences of people who live there’ (Baker 2016: 180). 
 
 
                                               
5 ‘NI survey suggests 50% neither unionist nor nationalist’, BBC News online, 20 June 2019 (accessed 10 July 
2019 here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-48702235) 




At issue for a region like Northern Ireland, with its fragile executive and administrative 
apparatus, is that civic space and democratic procedures are conceded to unaccountable 
corporate power. Of particular concern here, is the outsourcing of the sort of cultural work 
that would imagine and legitimize a regional or national community and identity. In this 
respect, it is worth considering Castlebrooke Investment’s recent proposals to develop the 
north east of Belfast’s city centre and the promotional film made to garner support for its 
plans.7 What is striking about the film is its imagining of Belfast in ways that make explicit a 
set of class relations – benign natives whose job it is to service an affluent, global 
professional class; and an urban milieu in which that class can work, play and live, seemingly 
spared bland globalization by the provision of local ‘colour’. It is also interesting because it is 
a projection of Belfast, not as it is, but as Castlebrooke Investments imagine it will be – could 
be – in the future, although it draws upon recognisable landmarks and place names to do this, 
many of which will presumably be altered by their plans. 
 
Castlebrooke Investments’ regeneration scheme takes in a 12-acre site beside Belfast’s St 
Anne's Cathedral and bordering Royal Avenue, Donegall Street, Lower Garfield Street and 
Rosemary Street. It plans to refurbish the area with residential space, office units as well as 
retail and hospitality elements at an estimated cost of £500m.8 The development was branded 
‘Tribeca Belfast’, to establish a positive association with the Tribeca area in New York, a 
place once associated with industrial buildings, now transformed into one of hip loft-living, 
trendy boutiques and restaurants.9 Its Belfast incarnation can be seen as part of a process of 
                                               
7 Tribeca Belfast’s website and video can be accessed here http://tribeca-belfast.co.uk 
8 ‘New £500m Tribeca project “will push Belfast to the forefront of European cities”’, Belfast Telegraph, 29 
November 2018 (accessed 5 May 2019 here https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/northern-ireland/new-
500m-tribeca-project-will-push-belfast-to-the-forefront-of-european-cities-37575827.html) 
9 The name ‘Tribeca’ in New York is derived from an abbreviation of "Triangle Below Canal Street": in Belfast 
it stands for “Triangle Beside the Cathedral”.  
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gentrification; this is the claiming of urban spaces for affluent users, or what David Harvey 
has referred to as ‘a process of displacement’ and ‘accumulation by dispossession’ that lies at 
the core of urbanization under capitalism (2008: 34). ‘It is the mirror-image of capital 
absorption through urban redevelopment, and is giving rise to numerous conflicts over the 
capture of valuable land from low-income populations that may have lived there for many 
years’ (Harvey 2008: 34). In Belfast, Castlebrooke Investments’ proposal has met opposition 
from existing users – residents and art groups – who are unimpressed by assurances of 
‘sensitive refurbishment’, fearing the loss of heritage and character, and describing the 
venture as a ‘superficial branding exercise’.10 I am less concerned here with questions of 
preservation and conservation. In any case, Castlebrook have reviewed their plans and 
decided that a ‘greater number of historic streetscape on original buildings in the area can 
[…] be retained’.11 I am more concerned with questions of political influence in the present, 
seeing the Tribeca promotional film as an attempt by a powerful interest group to define and 
imagine the city, and in particular its social relations, in terms that will benefit investors. 
 
The Castlebrooke film is 1 minute and 43 seconds long, and takes the narrative shape of ‘a 
day in the life of’ a city, at the centre of which are three character-types – a young couple, 
situated in a domestic context, unsurprisingly this appears to be a well-appointed loft 
conversion; a young man working in a contemporary office space; and an apparent tourist, 
subjecting the city to the curious gaze of the visitor. These types comprise the three 
anticipated purposes of the new development – residential living, working and leisure. The 
                                               
10 ‘Save CQ says Tribeca Belfast “superficial branding exercise”’ Irish News, 30 November 2018 (accessed on 6 
May 2019 here: https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2018/11/30/news/save-cq-says-tribeca-
belfast-superficial-branding-exercise--1497490/) 
11 “North Street Arcade to return as part of £500m Tribeca development”, Belfast Telegraph, 25 June 2019 




overarching theme is the convergence of the global and the local, communicated in the 
concluding line of the voice-over – ‘You are international heart: you are Belfast soul.’ This 
narration is delivered by Northern Irish-born actor Jamie Dornan, whose international 
celebrity, achieved through starring in the box office success Fifty Shades of Grey (dir. Sam 
Taylor-Johnson, 2015), makes him an attractive symbol, at once regionally recognisable, with 
global reach. Throughout the film Dornan recites a poem to Belfast, encouraging the city, and 
by extension its residents, to come to know themselves: ‘Ask yourself, who you are’, before 
immediately asserting, ‘For I know who you are.’ The film then goes onto define the city and 
its people through verse and images that extoll the assumed energy of the city, before 
referencing a series of stereotypes associated with Belfast – the Belfast bap, the Ulster fry, 
Guinness and craic etc. These are the symbols of a benign regional identity – a kin to the 
benign nationalism that Anholt sees as integral to successful branding and marketing 
exercises. Northern Ireland’s failure to find a neutral language and agreed symbols is 
overcome by coalescing around the image of a vibrant commercial centre, retailing local 
cuisine and the laying on of regional entertainment to a global, mobile professional class who 
are identifiable in the film through the markers of ethnic difference from the almost 
uniformly white locals.  
 
Middle class working life in this world is depicted within spacious, brightly-lit, hi-spec 
offices, peopled by well-tailored professionals. The working day is punctuated by lunchtime 
appointments in fashionable eateries and coffee bars, where the professionals mingle with 
joyfully eccentric locals, serviced by largely invisible workers, who presumably wait upon 
tables and pull pints of Guinness. As the film moves into the evening, the city holds out the 
promise of urban adventure. ‘Follow me’, coaxes the narrator as the camera tails our suave 
office manager down an indistinguishable street, lit for the evening, and into an urban milieu 
 20 
of cocktail bars, clubs, restaurants and dancing. In this section, the workers that make 
possible the commercial life of the city come into view – the bar tender, the chef, the 
musician, the busker. The portrayal of working life and commercial activity is interspersed 
with domestic routine – represented by the young couple, introduced at the beginning, 
waking in bed at dawn, decorating their tasteful apartment, then relaxing on the sofa. This is 
all delivered at a frenetic pace; a rapid montage of shots, full of movement, over a soundtrack 
of syncopated drum rhythms, that provide an audio-visual signal of the city’s modernity. 
There are only a few moments of respite from the pace: once, as we watch a pint of Guinness 
settle; a second moment of apparent reflection atop Cave Hill, when we witness the 
tourist/visitor looking down contemplatively at the city; and finally, at the conclusion when 
the film dwells for a moment on its central characters – the professional, the domestic couple, 
and finally the visitor. 
 
It is surely significant that the film ends with a series of close-up shots of its protagonists, and 
not an image of Belfast itself. After all, the Belfast that Castlebrooke Investments proposes 
does not yet exist, and its regeneration scheme will in any case refurbish the city. When 
Belfast does come into view it is distinguished only in a few brief images: street names; its 
City Hall, and the famous shipyard cranes, Samson and Golaith. Those sufficiently familiar 
with the city might be able to discern other locations, despite the tightly framed shots and 
fussy camera techniques. To be sure, this is no city symphony. Belfast is rendered largely 
expressionistically and in generically urban form: in dynamic movement, graffiti art, 
glimpses of street-life and architecture, and the sort of electric illumination associated with 
the modern urban environment. However, if the physical shape of this future Belfast is 
uncertain, its proposed social relations are clear: it will be peopled by a mobile professional 
class, waited upon and entertained by a local working class. Potentially bland, global 
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corporatism will, it is assumed, be alleviated by the nonthreatening vernacular traditions and 
tastes of the locals. Those conspicuous by their absence in this urban dream are the children 
and the elderly. Presumably, infants and pensioners serve no economic purpose and can 
therefore be elided from the frame. Dependency and infirmity erased, it is a landscape that 
need not imagine the provision of public services or civic amenities, such as health care, 
education or welfare. 
 
Tribeca Belfast has met with local resistance and its pretensions have been satirised and 
mocked on-line through social media. The Belfast City Council took a vote, which while 
welcoming the investment and development, objected to the name, Tribeca.12  It was a largely 
symbolic act since elected representatives are powerless to force the developers to change the 
name of the city centre project, but it seems that even minor objections to the designs of 
corporate power have the potential to besmirch the brand image of Belfast. Castlebrooke 
Investments’ response to the council’s deliberations carried about them a barely disguised 
threat of a capital strike. Its chief executive Neil Young commented: ‘The council's decision 
to debate the brand for our scheme will send a very clear negative message to other investors 
who are considering opportunities in Belfast.’  
 
Conclusion 
On the surface, Northern Ireland’s transformation has been extraordinary: from bomb-torn, 
failed state, to an attractive site for inward investment and tourism. However, much of this is 
precisely ‘on the surface’, because integral to the neoliberalisation of the region has been 
appearances: it is a façade, a chimera-like projection of fake shop fronts across Northern 
                                               
12 ‘Tribeca Belfast development name opposed by council’, BBC News online, 8 January 2019 (accessed on 6 
May 2019 here: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-46793162)  
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Ireland, erected on poster-board to hide the economic dereliction of its high streets13; or the 
rural landscapes and coasts that HBO has adorned with the computer generated imagery of a 
medieval-style fantasy; or, more particularly, Castlebrooke Investment’s ersatz projection of 
a gentrified future Belfast. Indeed, the desire to develop the city as normal and neutral has 
been likened to a cosmetic exercise (Neill, 1995), producing historic amnesia and blandness 
in a Kafkaesque attempt to deny Belfast’s true nature (Neill, 2006); a Potemkin Village 
masking the poverty, segregation and social exclusion of working class areas (Nagle 2009); 
and a ‘twin speed city’ where the educated and skilled race ahead, while those without such 
resources lag behind in ‘“sink” estates, stratified by poverty, segregation and fear’ (Murtagh 
2008: 4).  
 
Beyond the developer’s desire to paper over the social cracks, lies the troublesome question 
of how such alluringly glamourous, gentrified environments will be peopled. Liberal peace 
strategies and nation branding exercises prefer benign citizens, more concerned with the self-
interested pursuit of middle-class lifestyles and material prosperity than political passions and 
principles. They consequently underplay or ignore the much more decisive role of politically 
and socially motivated groups in securing peace and building upon it: for instance, women 
and gender politics, which on one occasion made a direct and influential intervention into the 
political process in the shape of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC). The 
NIWC succeeded in getting two women elected to the multi-party talks that led to the signing 
of the Good Friday Agreement (Fearon 1999; Kilmurray and McWilliams 2011). Political 
prisoners have also made a critical contribution to the peace process, bringing their influence 
to bear on the calling of republican and loyalist ceasefires, and in addition preparing a lot of 
                                               
13 ‘In Pictures: £8m spent on fake shop fronts in Northern Ireland’, Belfast Telegraph, 18 April 2014 (accessed 
12 July 2019 here: https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/in-pictures-8m-spent-on-fake-
shop-fronts-in-northern-ireland-30196699.html) 
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the intellectual and political groundwork for peace among their respective constituencies 
(Shirlow et al 2010). Like the NIWC, their representatives were elected to the multi-party 
peace talks, a number of them ex-prisoners. The trade union movement has periodically 
mobilized its members and the broader working class in defense of the peace process. When 
the IRA breached its ceasefire February 1996, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 
called a lunchtime rally that brought thousands of people into the centre of Belfast calling for 
its reinstatement.14 The ICTU also sponsored Counteract, a unit dedicated to tackling 
sectarianism in the workplace (Eyben et al 2002). It ran from 1990 until 2006 when it 
transformed into Trademark, which continues to maintain the commitment to anti-sectarian 
interventions, and has extended into a broader human rights and social justice agenda, 
offering educational programmes, research reports and training. In 2016 Trademark’s 
founding member Joe Law passed away. His obituaries are testament to the ‘major 
contribution’ he and Trademark made to dealing with sectarianism in workplace.15  
John Nagle (2008: 2009) has drawn attention to new social movements that have taken to the 
streets of the city to campaign on issues of gender, sexuality, class and the environment, and 
he highlights how they transcend the dominance of ethnonational divisions and challenge the 
hegemonic two-communities model. Nagle argues that these movements display a 
‘cosmopolitan imagination’ that offers expressions of solidarity, not only across sectarian 
lines, but solidarity that has the potential to ‘jump scales’ from the local to the global (2009: 
344). By contrast, Castlebrooke’s Tribeca promo offers a glimpse of a sterile corporate 
imagination, advancing a version of capitalist cosmopolitanism emptied of civic and 
                                               
14 ‘Call for IRA to renew ceasefire at Belfast peace rally’, Irish Times, 17 February 1996 (accessed 16 May 
2019 here: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/call-for-ira-to-renew-ceasefire-at-belfast-peace-rally-1.30521) 
15 ‘Obiturary: Joe Law’, Irish Times, 26 November 2016 (accessed 16 May 2019 here: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/obituary-joe-law-1.2881140). Also, ‘Joe Law: trade unionist, 




noncommodified bonds of solidarity. Its cast of politically innocuous local characters can 
perform their colloquial manners while waiting upon and beguiling the nomadic professionals 
and tourists who patronise the region. This is what it means to ‘live the brand’ in post-conflict 
Northern Ireland. It is to submit to the symbolic obliteration of the region’s history, politics 
and culture in a drive for corporate approval. That history, politics and culture is 
unquestionably troubled and troublesome, but it is not entirely defined by sectarianism. It has 
within it residual and emergent political convictions and forms of activism that might yet 
prove to be the best defence against persistent inequality, poverty, the corrosion of public 
services and the prevailing democratic deficit in region. Ironically, in its developers’ utopia 
of a future Belfast, Castlebrooke Investments may have given us a glimpse of gentrification’s 
gravediggers; a class who might reject the servility and benign corporate identities being 
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